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CASE COMMENTS
CRMINAL

LAW-PRODUCUiON OF GOVERNMENT REcO1Ds-CON-

DNiTAL CHARAcnm.-Petitioner, Jencks, was convicted of filing a
false non-communist affidavit. Harvey Matusow and J. W. Ford,
members of the Communist Party and paid FBI informants, testified
that petitioner was a member of the party for four years. Ford and
Matusow revealed during cross-examination that they had filed written and oral reports with the FBI concerning their association with
petitioner. Petitioner's motion for an order directing an inspection of
these reports, denied by the trial court, was also denied by the court
of appeals upon the ground that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any inconsistency between the informanfs testimony and their
reports. Held, that the petitioner is not required to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between reports and testimony of
witnesses, where their testimony reveals that the reports relate to
events about which they testified; moreover, only after an inspection
of such reports by the defense may a trial judge determine inconsistency, materiality and admissibility of their contents. Reversed.
Jencks v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1007 (1957).
Although inspection of an informant's prior statements had been
permitted prior to the principal case, formerly, a defendant was
compelled to demonstrate through cross-examination a conflict
between the statements of prosecuting witnesses made prior to the
trial of the case, and their testimony, before the defendant could
require the Government to produce these statements for inspection.
United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955). In order to withhold
statements from a defendant with impunity, the Government had
only to produce a witness who did not utilize his prior statements
to refresh his memory during his testimony, and one who could
refrain from revealing any discrepancies between his testimony and
statements. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 388 (9th Cir.
1951); James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1951).
Apparently, the government's witnesses were masters of this technique. Prior to the principal case, a substantial number of defendants appealed convictions upon the ground that the trial court erred
in refusing to exact prosecuting witnesses' prior statements; none of
these defendants, however, had been able to develop the requisite
inconsistency. See, e.g., Goldman v. United StatesV'3i6 U.S. 129
(1941); Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Simonds, 148 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Finally, in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1952), by
proper cross-examination, counsel was able to exact an admission
from a government witness that a conflict existed between his
present testimony and earlier statements; the Court held that the
defendant was entitled to inspect the statements involved. The
principal case extends this rule one step more, by permitting the
accused to inspect the statements of his accuser without establishing the aforementioned inconsistency. Mr. Justice Clark, in his
alarmed dissent, at page 1027, fears that ".... the Court has opened

their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday
for rummaging through confidential information." In point of fact,
no FBI files are made available to the defendant under the principal
case that were not already available under Gordon v. United States,
supra; the Court has merely dispensed with the requirement of an
acknowledged conflict between testimony and prior statements.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion, at page 1012,
indicates which government records will be affected; only those
reports of witnesses which relate to "....

the events and activities

related in their testimony," and only the statements of a prosecuting
witness may be inspected. The Court does not propose that the
petitioner should be permitted to wander aimlessly through the FBI
files in search of some document of an impeaching character.
Congress, in an effort to limit the language of the principal
case, has passed the so called Jencks Act, implementing the decision
and setting forth the procedure for production and inspection of
government records. The statute provides that when the United
States alleges that a portion of a statement ordered to be produced
contains irrelevant and perhaps confidential information, "....

the

court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With
such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such
statement to the defendant for his use." 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957).
There is an apparent conflict between this provision of the statute
and the language of Mr. Justice Brennan, at page 1018, "Because
only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective
use for purposes of discrediting the Government's witness . . . the

defense must initially be entitled to see them to determine what
use may be made of them." Curiously enough, the Jencks Act sets
forth just what the petitioner asked, while the Court gave him much
more. Mr. Justice Burton, points out in the concurring opinion, at
page 1017, that the procedure of having the trial court determine
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what portions of the statements are of value to the defendant has
been approved and is customary. Indeed, many federal decisions
have approved this method of procedure in regard to the type of
documents here involved. See, e.g., United States v. Beekman, 155
F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 77
(2d Cir. 1944).
In viewing the constitutionality of that part of the Jencks Act
which conflicts with the majority opinion, the Court can find abundant precedent for the view that granting a trial judge wide discretion in determining the materiality of evidence of this nature is
not a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Glasserv. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1941); United States v. Krule'witch, supra. Whether the defendant is allowed to inspect the
whole of an accuser's statement or only those portions which are,
in the judgment of the court, relevant and material, is not, however,
the critical element of the case. The Jencks Act recognizes that, whenever a defendant is faced with a government witness whose prior
statements may be of value for impeachment purposes, the defendant has a right to inspect such parts of his statements which touch
and concern the incriminating testimony without first laying a foundation of inconsistency between the reports and the testimony. The
Jencks Act, therefore stands a rather good chance of surviving.
The circumstances under which the FBI may be compelled to
produce certain of its files are quite limited. Nevertheless, even if
some portion of a statement, material to the informant's testimony,
contained confidential information, it has always been the law that,
in a criminal case, ". .. the Government may invoke evidentiary
privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The
rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which
prosecutes an accused also has a duty to see that justice is done, it
is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. ..." United State-s v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1952). Were it otherwise, the defense
would be deprived of an invaluable instrument for impeachment
purposes and powerless to contradict the false testimony of an arch
perjurer such as Matusow. See, Matusow v. United States,229 F.2d
335 (5th Cir. 1956).
A careful analysis of the principal case, as implemented by the
Jencks Act, can do much to dispel visions of communist and criminal
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elements "rummaging through" the files of the Department of Justice

on a "Roman holiday."
R. G. P.
JUDGMENT LiEN-DocRINE OF RELATioN BAcK-NoncE OF SUrT
AS NOTIcE OF LmiE.-A began a personal action against B in June,

1953, which was matured for trial at the term which began on
September 2, 1953. The trial of the case was begun on October 12,
1953, resulting in a judgment for A, rendered on November 17, 1953.
Cs, attorneys for B, to secure payment of legal fees, obtained from B
a deed of trust on certain real estate, executed on October 13, 1953.
In a partition suit in which all lienholders were named defendants, a
special commissioner in chancery designated A's judgment as fifth
and Cs' deed of trust sixth in order of priority. Upon exceptions, the
circuit court entered a decree holding that Cs' deed of trust was
entitled to be fifth in order of priority. Held, that sufficient time
having elapsed for the case to be matured for trial at the September
term, the judgment rendered on November 17, 1953, related back
and became effective on September 2, 1953, the first day of the
term, taking priority over the deed of trust of Cs who were not
purchasers for value without notice. Cooper v. Cooper, 98 S.E.2d
769 (W. Va. 1957).
W. VA. CODE c. 38, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1955), upon which the
decision is predicated, is as follows:
"Every judgment for money rendered in this state, other
than by confession in vacation, shall be a lien on all the real
estate of or to which the defendant is or becomes possessed
or entitled, at or after the date of the judgment, or if it was
rendered in court, at or after the commencement of the term at
which it was so rendered, if the cause was in such condition
that a judgment might have been rendered on the first day of
the term ... ."
At common law, by a legal fiction, the whole term is considered
as but one day, and the rule is that a judgment rendered on any day
has relation to and is a judgment of its first day. 2 F~mAN, JuDc,nmrs § 976 (5th ed. 1925). The statute is merely declaratory of the
common law. Smith v. ParkersburgCo-operative Assn, 48 W. Va.
232, 37 S.E. 645 (1900); Dunn's Eers v. Renick, 40 W. Va. 349, 22
S.E. 66 (1895). The court in the principal case, at page 773, declares
that "the manifest purpose of that part of the statute is to prevent
claimants from obtaining any advantage over one another by reason
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